The Struggle for Control of the Modern Corporation: Organizational Change at General Motors, 1924-1970Cambridge University Press, 2001 - 364 pages Drawing on primary historical material, this book provides a historical overview of decision making and political struggle within one of America's largest corporations. Robert Freeland examines the changes in General Motors organization between the years 1924 and 1970. He takes issue with the argument of business historian Alfred Chandler and economist Oliver Wiliamson, who contend that GM's multidivisional structure emerged and survived because it was more efficient than alternative forms of organization. The book illustrates that for most of its history, GM intentionally violated the fundamental axioms of efficient organization put forth by these analysts. Moreover, it was top management that advocated these changes. Owners vehemently opposed them, touching off a struggle over corporate organization inside GM that lasted for decades. Freeland uses the GM case to re-examine existing theories of corporate governance. |
Contents
The Modern Corporation and the Problem of Order | xiv |
Creating Corporate Order Conflicting Versions of Decentralization at GM 19211933 | 38 |
Administrative Centralization of the Mform 19341941 | 76 |
Participative Decentralization Redefined Mobilizing for War Production 19411945 | 122 |
The Split between Finance and Operations Postwar Problems and Organization Structure 19451948 | 169 |
Consent as an Organizational Weapon Coalition Politics and the Destruction of Cooperation 19481958 | 216 |
Consent Destroyed The Decline and Fall of General Motors 19581980 | 264 |
Conclusion | 288 |
General Motors Financial Performance 19211987 | 317 |
Index | 348 |
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The Struggle for Control of the Modern Corporation: Organizational Change at ... Robert F. Freeland No preview available - 2005 |
Common terms and phrases
Accession 1334 Accession 542 Administration Committee air-cooled Albert Bradley Alfred Sloan Annual Report antitrust approval April April 13 argued automobile Buick capital Carpenter centralization chairman Chandler and Salsbury changes charge Chevrolet corporation's costs Curtice Curtice's decision-making divi division managers divisional consent divisional participation Donaldson Brown E. I. du Pont efficiency engineering Exec Executive Committee fiat Finance Committee finance staff financial control financial veto firm formal Frederic Donner governance group executives Harlow Curtice headquarters increased issues Lammot du Pont line authority Longwood mittee Motors Corporation office executives operating management operating policy operating side organizational owner control participative decentralization percent Policy Committee policy groups Pont's postwar president problems production profits proposed policies Raskob responsibility return on investment Ronald Evans sion strategic planning structure textbook M-form tion top executives turnover United States Congress vice-president Williamson Wilson